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1 Introduction
The expansion and contraction of portfolio capital
flows from the global financial centres towards
emergingmarkets over thepast decadehas generated
considerable controversy over their underlying
economic determinants, and by extension their
instability: there is growing evidence that these are
related to conditions in the financial markets of
developed countries (FitzGerald 2002).The resulting
asset bubbles have a serious impact on the real
economy in developing countries even in the
presence of low inflation, fiscalbalance andmonetary
rectitude (IMF 2000). More seriously, such
fluctuations degrade income distribution and social
services, thus exacerbating poverty problems
(FitzGerald 2001). Nonetheless, orthodox policy
design by international financial institutions such
as the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank still focuses on the conditions in
emerging (“host”)markets themselves –oftenknown
as “fundamentals” – rather than the determinants
of the demand in developed (“home”) countries for
emerging market securities as an asset class.
The economic theory of international capital
markets is still in its infancy, in marked contrast to
the sophistication of the microeconomics of
portfolio choice. Sticky prices,market segmentation,
heterogeneous investors, persistent currency
misalignments despite arbitrage and the cost of
scarce information all need to be accounted for if
themodel is even to approximate the real world in
a useful way (Dumas 1994). In marked contrast,
the framework that informs policy debate appear
to reflect, in essence, a simple microeconomic
portfolio composition rule based on given relative
returns and risks of various assets. Policy in
developing countries is then directed towards
reducing the risk of and increasing the return in
these assets by appropriatemacroeconomic regimes,
liberalisation strategies and property guarantees.
However, neither the internal dynamics of capital
markets – particularly the tendency to endogenous
asset bubbles – nor the consequences of external
shocks such as US interest rates, are not seen as
relevant objectives for international development
policy.
Recent academic literature has begun to
emphasise home market factors such as interest
rates, changing risk appetite, herding behaviour
and momentum trading. However, attempts to
model these flows have revealed difficulties in
separating home from host factors – or “push” and
“pull” effects as they are conventionally known.
This is because aggregate flows and yield spreads
do not simply reflect an underlyingmicroeconomic
process of portfolio allocation, based on known
risk and return characteristics of emergingmarkets
in relation to wealth and riskless return on the
investors’ ownmarket.At themacroeconomic level
aggregate market behaviour is such that:
1. International capital markets do not fully clear
– in the sense that even at equilibrium some
borrowers are “rationed out” and cannot borrow
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at any rate of interest – so that demand
fluctuations are reflected in unstable flows rather
than smooth price adjustment.1
2. Capital flows themselves affect asset prices both
directly (by creating and collapsing asset price
bubbles) and indirectly (through increasing or
decreasing default risk).
3. Observed asset yields can have apparently
perverse effects on flows because of the risk
premium they contain, so that higher yields are
associated with reduced flows.
4. The changing level of investor risk appetite on
the homemarket affects both asset prices (which
include adefault risk premium) and capital flows
themselves (through credit rationing).
In consequence, “getting the fundamentals right”
– such as reduced government expenditure,
restrictive monetary policy, public enterprise
privatisation or liberalisation of trade and finance
–may not be sufficient for opendeveloping countries
to avoid balance of payments instability.This article
attempts to encompass these notions formally and
to test themempirically for USpurchases of emerging
market sovereign bonds, and thus lead to a revision
of policy recommendations.
2 The state of the art in modelling
capital flows to developing
countries
Since the early 1990s, when the surge of capital
flows to emerging markets got underway, the
academic research literature has begun to reveal
the importance of these factors, which reflect
fluctuations in developed country demand for
developing country assets. Calvo et al. (1993)
observed that LatinAmerican reserves and exchange
rates (as a proxy for capital flows) move together
and concluded that common external shocks are a
major determinant of capital inflows.2 Fernandez-
Arias (1996) addressed the determination of country
risk as the channel through which exogenous shocks
are transmitted to portfolio inflows, finding that
external (“push”) factors have a substantial impact
on creditworthiness as reflected in the secondary
market debt prices. Montiel and Reinhart (1999)
examined the volume and composition of capital
inflows to developing countries and conclude that
international interest rates have an important effect
on not only the level of flows but also the balance
between bonds, equity and bank credit. Montiel
and Reinhart (2001) suggested that in addition
there are “step” effects arising from the progressive
integration of developing countries to global capital
markets that make them more sensitive to
international interest rates. Finally, Mody et al.
(2001) included a wider range of push factors (i.e.
asset demand fluctuations) than US growth and
interest rates – particularly US high-yield spreads3
as a proxy for risk aversion. They conclude that in
general, pull factors aremore important in the long-
run but that push factors are determinant in short-
run dynamics. They treat bond yields exogenous
variable, implicitly assuming that yields are
unaffected by the capital flows themselves, even
though this can clearly lead to underestimation of
the strength of asset demand fluctuations.
Moreover, the country level approach in these
articles has the disadvantage that the push factors
may be underestimated because flows from all host
countries are included but only US factors are
considered. In consequence, some authors have
examined the capital outflows to emergingmarkets
from the USA alone. Taylor and Sarno (1997)
examine the determinants of US portfolio capital
outflows towards Latin America and Asia using
cointegration techniques. They find that global
(“push”) and domestic (“pull”) factors have similar
importance in explaining short-run equity flows to
Asia and Latin America. However, for the short-
run dynamics of bond flows, global factors
(particularly US interest rates) are found to bemore
important than domestic factors. Chuhan et al.
(1998)modelUS portfolio flows to LatinAmerican
and Asian markets, using the panel data method.
They find, in contrast, that push factors (the
slowdown inUS industrial production and the drop
in US interest rates) are the main determinants of
portfolio flows to Latin America and Asia.
The only attempt so far to model asset demand
and supply effects in conjunction is an innovative
disequilibrium model of capital flows to four
emerging markets – Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and
Korea – in Mody and Taylor (2002). They derive
this model from the seminal Stiglitz–Weiss (1981)
theory of credit rationing, which allows for such
market disequilibria explicitly.Using themaximum
likelihood estimation technique, they estimate push
and pull factors4 separately for capital flows for each
country. The technique then estimates the
probability of asset supply exceeding demand at
any one point in time, which the authors term a
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“capital crunch”.The demand factors include short-
term and long-term US interest rates, the US high
yield spread and US industrial production; while
supply factors include the international cost of
capital (proxied by themean emergingmarket bond
yields, host stockmarket indices and reserve levels.
They find that the demand for emerging market
assets operates through two distinct channels: on
the one hand, US industrial production growth
raises the supply of capital (that is, the demand for
assets); on the other, increased US high-yield
reduces it – which they interpret as reflecting the
opportunity cost of US risk capital. This model
marks a significant step forward from the single-
equation push-pull model, particularly the explicit
handling of capital rationing. However, there are
two aspects where our approach differs from that
of Mody and Taylor. First, the negative impact of
the US high-yield spread on flows to emerging
markets indicates that what is being captured is
changes in risk aversion; and second, the inclusion
of emergingmarket yield spreads as an independent
variable overlooks the fact that flows can clearly
affect spreads inversely.
In sum, while the recent literature throws
valuable light on the influence of home shocks on
capital flows to emergingmarkets, it is incorrect in
taking the yield spread to be an independent
variable. Even the IMF admits that ‘the stance and
predictability of USmonetary policy is important
in explaining fluctuations in developing country
interest rate spreads’ (IMF 2000: 68). This is
supported by the recent literature on the
determination of emerging market bond spreads
themselves. Eichengreen and Mody (1998)
modelled these spreads as a function of global
economic conditions (proxied by the rate on 10-
year US treasuries) and issuer characteristics of the
borrower such as region, whether it is sovereign,
andmacroeconomic characteristics.Curiously, they
find that a rise inUS interest rates is associated not
only with a lower probability of a bond issue (i.e.
primary asset supply) which theory predicts, but
also with reduced spreads which it does not.
However, whenArora andCerisola (2000) estimated
the influence on country risk (proxied by sovereign
bond spreads) of US monetary policy, host
fundamentals, and world capital market conditions
they found that this ambiguous result was due to
proxying US monetary policy by the yield on
Treasury securities. When the US Federal Funds
target rate was used, they found direct positive
effects on sovereign bond spreads, as theory
anticipates. Nonetheless, this particular literature
does not seem to take into account the effect of
capital flows themselves as asset prices and debt
levels, and thus yield spreads.
3 Accounting for portfolio investor
behaviour
There are strong explicit indications that home
factors affect both flows and spreads – in fact the
IMF (2000) suggests that about half of their
observed variance can be explained by these factors
– but also the implication that flows and spreads
are co-determined. This does not just mean that
they should be modelled simultaneously but also
that aggregate market interactions may cause
additional instability – with serious consequences
for developing countries.
The logic of home portfolio investor behaviour
in response to market signals also has significant
consequences for the pricing of developing country
assets, quite independently of the underlying
fundamentals.Recent work on herding by investors
indicates that three causes canbe involved (Devenow
andWelch 1996). First, payoff externalities where
payoff to an agent adopting an action is positively
related to the number of agents adopting the same
action. Second,principle-agent considerations such
that a manager, in order to maintain or gain
reputation whenmarkets are imperfectly informed,
may prefer either to “hide in the herd” to avoid
evaluation or “ride the herd” in order to improve
reputation.And third, information cascades where
later agents, inferring information from the actions
of prior agents, optimally decide to ignore their own
information.Moreover, asset valuationmethods and
portfolio composition rules used by investors in
practice tend to be rather crude, being largely based
on considerations of liquidity and exit possibilities
(Clark et al. 1993).
There are thus severe limitations to the use of
yield spreads on emerging market bonds, as
evidence of markets perception of asset quality in
the formof underlying default risk: ‘care is needed
in interpreting yield spreads, since they are
influenced by a variety of factors other than the
perceived creditworthiness of the borrower
including investors’ appetite for risk and the
liquidity of particular instruments’ (Cunningham
et al. 2001: 175).
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Clearly higher home interest rates, lower
volatility in home assets, higher covariance between
these and emerging market assets, and higher risk
aversion will all reduce demand for emergingmarket
assets independently of the supply conditions
(Disyatat and Gelos 2001). Further, pervasive
herding behaviour causes a “momentum” effect in
which demand for an asset becomes a positive
function of the quantity (capital flow) itself. There
is thus good reason to see risk aversion (or “risk
appetite”) as a variable in itself, which is not only
changing but also path dependent, varying with
past experience of yields and bubbles and thus
potentially strongly pro-cyclical. For instance, the
IMF recognises that risk aversion changes over time
in practice and uses, for this purpose, the JPMorgan
Global Risk Aversion Index (IMF 2001), which
measures monetary liquidity and credit premia.
Econometric analysis of US mutual fund
portfolios shows that their momentum trading in
emerging market equities is positive – they
systematically buy winners and sell losers
(Kaminsky et al. 2000). Investors also engage in
“contagion trading” – that is they sell assets from
one country when asset prices fall in another – and
“benchmarking”, where they follow the average
portfolio choices of themarket as a whole.Disyatat
and Gelos (2001) also found that benchmarking
explains observed behaviour of US mutual funds
specialising in emerging markets better than the
textbook rebalancing rule. The consequence is that
when emerging market asset prices are rising (i.e.
yield spreads are falling) investors will buy more,
rather than rebalancing their portfolios towards
assets with ahigher return.The reverse occurs when
prices are falling, causing largemarket fluctuations
known as “bubbles” that are not caused by
fundamentals in either the home or host markets.
Kumar and Persaud (2001) have pointed out
that changes in risk aversion – or its counterpart,
risk appetite – have received comparatively little
attention in the academic literature, even though
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Figure 1: US Gross Purchases of Developing Country Bonds (LTBDC) and their Yield
Spread over US Treasuries (Spread_EM) between 1987 and 2002
Note: LTBDC in logarithmic form, and Spread_EM in per cent.
Source: US Treasury and Bloomburg.
discussed inmarket and policy circles.5 They argue
that risk aversion contains structural components
(the underlying utility function and financial market
structure) and a time varying element reflecting
shorter-term factors such as so-called “wake-up
calls”. Clearly, not only does a rise in risk aversion
(fall in risk appetite)6 cause a fall in asset price for
a given risk level, but also the impact on price will
be greater for riskier asset classes. Applying this
argument to our context, to the extent that home
risk aversion is reflected in US risk spreads, then
the same change in risk appetite would be reflected
in Emerging Market spreads, as well as in the
aggregate flows due to the capital market rationing
effect.
To encompass these microeconomic aspects of
investor behaviour, and taking into account the
characteristics of aggregate capital flows discussed
in the previous section, it should be clear that a
model for empirical testing should have the
following five characteristics:
1. Spreads impact flows negatively because of the
risk information they contain; while flows impact
spreads negatively because increased demand
drives up the price.
2. Risk aversion varies over time, and affects flows
negatively due to asymmetric rationing, and
yield spreads positively due to risk pricing.
3. There are lagged effects of past-on-present flows
due tomomentum trading, and past-on-present
spreads due to asset bubbles.
4. The familiar home variables such as riskless
return and wealth (or liquidity) and host
variables to reflect fundamentals such as real
return and probability of default, are included.
5. A simultaneous equation system to capture the
interaction of price (yield spread) and quantity
(capital flow) in equilibrium.
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Figure 2: US Gross Purchases of Developing Country Bonds (LTBDC) and US High-Yield
Spread (Spread_HY) between 1987 and 2002
Note: LTBDC in logarithmic form, and Spread_HY in per cent.
Source: US Treasury and Bloomburg.
4 Testing of the new model of
capital flows to developing
countries
The model discussed above has been tested on
monthly 1987–2003 data for totalUSbond flows to
developing countries from the US Treasury
Department’s InternationalCapitalReports andEMBI
(EmergingMarkets Bond Index) data on sovereign
spreads from Bloomburg.7 Technical details of data
processing, econometricmethod anddiagnostics can
be found inFitzGerald andKrolzig (2003a).Figure 1
shows themain characteristics of flows and spreads
that themodelmust explain: thehigh level of volatility
and the inverse relationship between the two.
Our data source for risk aversion is theUS high-
yield spread (HYS). This is plotted against bond
flows in Figure 2, where the inverse relationship is
evident. In view of the relative size of the two
markets, any causality must presumably run from
the US home market to emerging markets rather
than the other way around.
The exact formulation of the proxy variable for
risk aversion from theHYS data is complicated.The
discussion in the previous section implies that the
data should be used to produce a risk aversion
measure such as the ratio of themean to the standard
deviation which would be equivalent to the “Sharpe
Ratio” used in practice to express a particular
investor’s balancebetween risk and return.8However,
it appears from the literature that changes in HYS
itself are the best empirical representation of risk
aversion. Figure 3 shows the relationship between
the spread between high yield (“junk”) bonds and
treasury bills on theUSmarket on the one hand and
the spread between developing country bond yields
and US treasuries on the other. The relationship
between the two is clearly quite close.
The econometricmodelling of these relationships
is explained in detail in FitzGerald and Krolzig
(2003a).9 In explaining aggregate bond flows, the
flow in the previous month is themajor explanatory
variable, with high degree of persistence (60 per
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Figure 3: US High-Yield Spread (Spread_HY) and Developing Country Yield Spread over US
Treasuries (Spread_EM) between 1987 and 2002
Note: Spread_HY and Spread_EM in basis points (hundredths of a per cent).
Source: US Treasury and Bloomburg.
cent) reflecting momentum trading. This helps
explain why the fluctuations are so large. The effect
of spreads on flows is also significant and of the
negative sign predicted by our model, because of
the risk premium it contains. The measure of risk
aversion, the change inHYS for the previous month
is also significant and of the expected negative sign,
thus supporting our notion of risk aversion and
credit rationing – the lag presumably reflecting
portfolio adjustment delays. US industrial
production (as a proxy for monthly GDP) was
significant and with the correct sign, reflecting the
hypothesised wealth effect, while the results for the
Federal Funds rate appear to reflect the influence
of changes at the 6-weekly meeting of the Open
Markets Committee. However, the outstanding
bond stock and aggregatemergingmarket liquidity,
included as aproxy for fundamentals for developing
countries as a whole, did not prove significant.
Themajor explanator of yield spreads is lagged
yield spread itself, with the expected (positive) sign
and a very high degree of persistence (84 per cent)
presumably reflecting the asset bubbles discussed
above. In other words, asset prices are mainly
determined by the previous month’s level. As
anticipated, bond flows themselves are a significant
variable, with the negative sign predicted above.
Again, as in the case of flows, the change inHYS as
ameasure of home risk aversion itself is significant
and has expected (positive) sign. It is of interest to
note that the US variables (funds rate, liquidity,
output) did not turn out to be significant in
explaining the yield spread: the effect of these
variables is felt on the flow of bonds and this appears
to confirm the view that this is a rationed credit
market where shocks affect quantity rather than
price. Interestingly in view of the number of
emerging market crises during this period, only
one seems to have been econometrically significant
– that for the Russian collapse in August 1998.
Overall, this model can explain 81 per cent of
observed variations in bond flows and 87 per cent
of those in yield spreads. This implies that by far
the greater part of emerging bondmarket volatility
is explained by market interactions (expressed by
the persistence in flows and spreads as well as their
lagged effect on each other) on the one hand; and
the combination of home risk aversion, home
interest rates and home income levels on the other.
In other words as far as this asset class as a whole
is concerned, shifts in the demand schedule and
their effects are more significant than overall
fundamentals. This could be because investors
apply a portfolio allocation procedure in two stages:
first they allocate funds to emerging markets as an
asset class, withUS risk appetite and interest rates
interacting with the yield spread – which itself is a
result of these same flows; second, investors allocate
their purchases between individual emerging
markets in response to the fundamentals these
markets demonstrate.
5 Policy implications
These are clearly initial results, although they are
clearly significant.The next research step is to test a
similar model on flows to individual emerging
markets – andpreliminary results indicate that here
too a simultaneous-equation approach is fruitful and
that host fundamentals are significant determinants
of the share of bond flows going to a particular
country.10This seems to confirm the validity of a two-
stage modelling approach reflecting portfolio
strategies where investors allocate funds to emerging
markets as an asset class, and thenbetween countries
– wheremacroeconomic characteristics and regional
factors determine country shares.
Meanwhile, the main result is that shifts in the
international demand schedule for developing
country assets, magnified by the behavioural
characteristics of investment managers, are themain
determinants of themarket volatility that has caused
somuch difficulty for the attainment of sustainable
economicdevelopment and thus permanent poverty
reduction. Five tentative policy implications would
seem to follow logically from this conclusion.
First, the strong evidence for momentum trading
and price bubbles (reflected in the extent of the
persistence in the flow and spreadmodels detailed
above) implies that there are considerable costs for
developing countries of way in which markets
operate internally. This problem could be tackled
by more detailed knowledge of developing countries
and independent decision-making by investment
managers, but there is no reason to believe that they
will do this unless the regulatory framework is
modified in order to provide incentives for them
to do so.
Second, G3 governments11 could pay more
attention to the negative effects on emergingmarkets
of volatility within their own capital markets. As
the IMF points out, ‘an approach tomonetary policy
that provides financialmarkets with clear indications
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of theUS authorities’ intentions is likely to reduce
the impact of a US rate increase on developing
countries’ (IMF 2000: 68).However, the ability of
the G3 to stabilise or even predict their
macroeconomic cycles – let alone their willingness
to intervene in their own capital markets to benefit
developing countries – is clearly limited.
Third, a more feasible approach might be to
encourageG3 institutional investors to acquire and
hold emerging market assets of a longer maturity
than at present, by regulatory or even tax incentives.
This would in effect both shift thedemand “upwards”
and reduce its volatility over the cycle by increasing
risk appetite on a structural basis. The advantages
to institutional investors would be higher long-term
yields without the excess risk generated by the
market instability of the past decade.
Fourth, greater liquidity – and thus more stability
– in the developing country bondmarket could be
achieved by the international financial institutions
themselves or groups of central banks (probably
on a regional basis) acting as “market makers”.They
would commit to counter-cyclical intervention,
buying bonds on the secondary market on the
downswing (when risk appetite declines) and selling
on the upswing. This would bemore effective than
the present practice of last-resort lending once crises
have occurred, since it would reduce the ex-ante
volatility of emerging market assets.
Fifth, the last option in the absence of
international cooperation would be intervention by
individual developing countries. These could take
the form of prudential restrictions borrowing on
international capitalmarkets by governments, banks
and firms; but this would deny developing countries
the opportunity tomanagemacroeconomic shocks
arising from trade, productivity or fiscal shocks.
Capital controls in the formof tax incentives can be
effective as a means of reducing the volatility of
foreign investors’ holding of domestic securities on
developing country stock markets.However, such
incentives canhave little effect on internationalbond
issues precisely because they are traded globally –
inNew York and London.
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Notes
* I would like to acknowledge the invaluable econometric
and statistical support of Derya Krolzig in this research
project: the full econometric results are available in
FitzGerald andKrolzig (2003a). Research for this article
was funded by the UK Department for International
Development (DFID) under the Globalisation and
Poverty Programme. I would also like to thank Stephany
Griffith-Jones for her inspiration and support for this
research.
1. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1992) for a fuller discussion of
the macroeconomic consequences of credit rationing,
and Folkerts-Landau (1985) for a pioneering application
to international credit markets.
2. Although, Chuhan et al. (1998) point out that reserves
are only weakly correlated with portfolio capital flows
and so should not really be used as a proxy.
3. The difference between the yield on sub-investment grade
(“junk”) bonds and 10-year US Treasuries.
4. They refer to these as “capital supply” and “capital
demand” respectively, which is not uncommon in the
literature – but I feel that “asset demand” (and by
implication “asset supply”) is the only nomenclature
consistent with the underlying portfolio decisions made
by investors.
5. One reason for this may be that standardneoclassical theory
derives risk aversion from the underlying utility function
of the “representative agent”, which is assumed to be
invariant – unlike of course Keynesian “animal spirits”.
6. Kumar and Persaud estimate risk appetite by calculating
excess returns (the difference between spot rates and
forward rates from the previous period) on 17 emerging
market currencies over 10 years.Their risk appetite index
exhibits marked quarterly and annual cycles, and troughs
that appear to be correlated with major market
discontinuities.
7. The data for other explanatory variables come from
various sources: International Financial Statistics (US
Industrial Production Index), Bloomberg (US high-yield
spread), US FederalReserve System (M3 USMoney Stock,
US Federal Funds Rate), and Cross Border Capital
(EmergingMarket Liquidity Index).
8. See Caouette et al. (1998: 242).
9. The key results are as follows for flows (LTBDC) and
spreads (Spread _EM) respectively:
where the explanatory variables are change in US
industrial production index (∆LIIP), the Federal Funds
rate (FedFunds), the change in theUS high-yield spread
(∆Spread_HY) and an impulse dummy (I) significant
breaks in the series.
10.Preliminary results are reported in FitzGerald andKrolzig
(2003b).
11.That is, those of the US, EU and Japan.
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